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CoMMENTS
and efficient manner, once a rational basis for divorce law is estab-
lished.
Under medieval law there was a kind of rough-and-tumble justice
by ordeal in which the parties stood with their arms crossed over
their breasts and the one who endured the longer was declared
the winner. We are still too close to this kind of justice in our
divorce cases. Alimony will never be an easy problem to solve, but
we can help both husbands and wives by bringing our alimony
customs up to date.51
George A. Smith
Wn APPNc,-PowER OF UN=r STATES ATrORNEY-GENEBAL TO AuTmo-
PIZE WMETAPmPIN WITHOUT JUDICIAL SAcroN.-The Federal Con-
stitution has established, in the Bills of Rights, certain precious and
delicate freedoms which are the heritage of every citizen of the United
States. The founders of this country have entrusted the duty of
interpreting the scope of these rights solely to the judiciary. Being
in the ostensibly objective position of arbiter, the judiciary must
define the nature of each of these personal protections. Perhaps the
most sensitive of these delicate freedoms is the freedom from unreason-
able searches and seizures guaranteed by the fourth amendment.
Conflicts have arisen where a government official in a more or less
subjective position has attempted to define the extent of this freedom.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit faced this
very problem in United States v. United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division."
The defendants in this case were indicted for conspiring to commit
the destruction and depredation of government property.2 Before the
51 Hofstadter and Herzog, supra note 6, at 70.
I No. 71-1105 (6th Cir. April 8, 1971).
2The defendants were indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (1964). The pertinent part of section 371 reads:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in
any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any
act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Section 1361 reads:
Whoever willfully injures or commits any depredation against any property
of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, or any
property which has been or is being manufactured or constructed for
the United States, or any department or agency thereof, shall be punished
as follows:
If the damage to such property exceeds the sum of $100, by a fine of not
more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both;
(Continued on next page)
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trial the defendants filed a motion for disclosure of certain wiretapping
evidence that had been procured by the government, and the motion
was granted by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, Southern Division. The United States then
filed a petition for a writ of mandamus asking that the district court's
order be set aside. In support of its position the government attached
an affidavit signed by Attorney-General John Mitchell, stating that
the wiretaps involved were "expressly approved" by him in his capacity
as Attorney-General and as agent of the President, and that "it would
prejudice the national interest to disclose the particular facts sur-
rounding these surveillances, other than to the court in camera." The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petition for a writ of
mandamus and upheld the district court's order, thus rejecting this
broad assertion of power by the Attorney-General.
The problems created by wiretapping and its infringement of the
personal privacy of individuals are not so new that they lack a sub-
stantial historical background. The first widespread use of wiretaps
by law enforcement officers coincided with the rise of organized crime
during Prohibition. However, fear of security leaks during World
War One caused Congress to place an absolute ban on wiretapping. 3
After that war the use of wiretaps by the Justice Department was
resumed until prohibited by Attorney-General Stone in 1924. Such a
policy continued until 1931, when Attorney-General W. D. Mitchell
renewed the practice, citing the disadvantages faced by the govern-
ment in fighting organized crime without the aid of wiretaps.4 Perhaps
giving rise to this policy shift was the Supreme Court's decision in
Olmstead v. United States.5 In that case, a five-man majority of the
Court ruled that since wiretaps used by Treasury agents investigating
a suspected bootlegger did not physically invade the defendant's
premises, nor result in any physical seizure of tangible objects, the
taps did not constitute a fourth amendment search and seizure, and
therefore the wiretap evidence was admissible. Thus arose the premise
that the fourth amendment protects places, not people. This thesis re-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
if the damage to such property does not exceed the sum of $100, by a
fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than one
year, or both.
One defendant, Plamondon, was alleged to have destroyed government property
worth more than $100.
3 Westin, The Wire Tapping Problem: An Analysis and A Legislative Proposal,
52 CoLum. L. REv. 165, 172 (1952); Act of October 29, 1918, ch. 197, § 1, 40
Stat. 1017.
4 Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 CoNELL L.Q. 195, 196
(1954).
5 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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mained the guiding judicial principle in eavesdropping cases for
nearly forty years."
In Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934,7 Con-
gress apparently banned wiretaps once again. The statute said that
no one, without the sender's authorization, could "intercept any com-
munication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, or substance"
of such communication "to any person." This wording, of course,
created speculation about whether or not agents could "intercept"
communications as long as they did not "divulge" them.8 This specu-
lation did not end, even after the Supreme Court's first confrontation
with Section 605 in the case of Nardone v. United States.9 There it
was held that no wiretap evidence could be used as testimony in the
federal courts, even when introduced by federal agents. However, the
court did not definitely say whether such information might be subject
to interception as long as it was not used as evidence. The case was
remanded to the district court. Later, upon writ of certiorari, Nardone
was again before the Supreme Court and testimony regarding the
"fruits" of such wiretaps was also excluded.10
But wiretapping by federal agents did not end; instead, it received
a new impetus. The early use of wiretaps was justified as being
necessary to combat domestic crime. With the advent of World War
Two and the Cold War, this rationale began to change and the
protection of "national security" against international threats became
the major justification for government eavesdropping."
In Olmstead the Supreme Court had held the exclusionary rule
applied only to violations of the Constitution, not to statutory viola-
tions.12 The Court returned to this concept in Goldstein v. United
States'3 to avoid the effect of Section 605 and the Nardone cases. 14
As a result, evidence obtained in violation of Section 605 was admissible
as long as the defendant's personal rights were not violated. Thus,
when evidence used against a defendant was obtained in violation of a
third party's rights, such evidence could be used in court. On the
6 Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance By Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in
Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 169, 170 (1969). See generally Karabian, The
Case Against Wiretapping, 1 PACC L.J. 133 (1970).
747 U.S.C. § 605 (1964).8 Brownell, supra note 4, at 197.
9 302 U.S. 379 (1937). The Court emphasized the fact that the crucial issue
was the "divulgence' and made no reference to the specific question of "inter-
pretation."
10 Nardone v. United States, 808 U.S. 338 (1939).
11 Brownell, supra note 4, at 198.
12 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928).
13 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
14 See J. LANDYNsxI, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE AND = SuPREm CousT: A
STUmY iN CONSTrrTToNAL INTERPRETATIoN 211 (1966).
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same day Goldstein was decided, the Court, in Goldman v. United
States,15 held that listening from an adjoining room to the defendant
speaking into a telephone receiver did not violate Section 605. Speak-
ing for the majority, justice Roberts stated: "The protection intended
and afforded by the statute [Section 605] is of the means of communica-
tion and not of the secrecy of the conversation."16 These two cases
severely limited the thrust of Section 605. It was not until 1957, in Ben-
anti v. United States,'7 that the Supreme Court began returning to the
liberal stance it had assumed in the late 1930's. In that case the Court
said that Section 605 "[11lequired a more stringent exclusionary rule
in wiretapping cases than was required by the fourth amendment in
search cases." 8 Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Warren noted:
"Section 605 contains an express, absolute prohibition against the
divulgence of intercepted communications." 19 But despite the Benanti
decision, several courts continued to issue wiretap orders,20 and, prior
to the Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United States,21 the federal
government continued to hold the Olmstead view "that electronic sur-
veillance was unlawful only when accomplished by a trespass."22 In
Katz, the Court finally overturned Olmstead and ruled that the
fourth amendment protected people, not places.23 However, in Katz
the Court also said that electronic devices could be used to invade
an individual's privacy, as long as the approval of a magistrate was
obtained in advance. The question which remained unanswered in
Katz was whether the President, or his agent, could lawfully authorize
a wiretap without judicial intervention to protect the national secu-
rity2 4 The Supreme Court has yet to resolve this question. In the
present case the Sixth Circuit considered only half of the issue, that
involving domestic threats to the nation's security. The other side of
15 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
16 Id. at 133.
17355 U.S. 96 (1957).
18 Landynski, supra note 14, at 214.
19 355 U.S. 96, 102 (1957).
20 See Landynski, supra note 14, at 217, where the author quotes a New York
legislative report issued in 1959:
The Berente decision has been on the books since 1957, but it has never
been implemented. Except as noted law enforcement wiretapping has
proceeded in New York as before. Id., at 217, note 80.
21389 U.S. 347 (1967).22 Spritzer, supra note 6, at 193 n. 120.
23 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The court affirmatively stated:
But this effort to decide whether or not a given "area," viewed in the
abstract, is "constitutionally protected" defeats attention from the
problem presented by this case. For the Fourth Amendment protects
people not places." Id. at 351.
24389 U.S. 347, 358 n. 23 (1967).
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the coin, executive authority for wiretaps in cases involving foreign
security threats, was not considered.
There have been several recent cases wherein the Supreme Court
has stopped immediately short of answering the crucial question that
was met by the Sixth Circuit in the case at hand. A situation similar
to the one in the present case came before the Supreme Court in
Ivanov v. United States.25 In Ivanov the issue was whether or not the
government had to filly disclose evidence it had obtained by illegally
eavesdropping on the defendants. In his brief for the government,
the Solicitor General did not contend that evidence obtained through
electronic eavesdropping was admissible in a criminal trial, even dur-
ing a national security investigation. Instead, the government claimed
that the interceptions were irrelevant to the charges and urged that
the trial judge examine them in camera to determine the irrelevance.
It is interesting to note that the same procedure was desired by the
government in the present case. In Ivanov the Supreme Court rejected
that procedure, declaring that the defendant was entitled to a full dis-
closure of any evidence obtained through any illegal surveillance
which has taken place.26 Unfortunately Ivanov, like Katz, failed to
answer the question of the Attorney-General's power to authorize
wiretaps in national security cases.
The subsequent case of Taglianetti v. United States27 likewise
granted the defendant a considerable degree of latitude for discovery.
In that case the Supreme Court ruled that "the defendant was entitled
to see a transcript of his own conversations and nothing else."28 The
Sixth Circuit in the present case mentioned the Taglianetti decision
and specifically noted the government's concession that the defendant's
own conversation was the entire substance of the wire taps at issue.29
In July of 1970 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States
v. Clay,30 held that "[T]he defendant had no right to see records or
logs of conversations to which he was not a party.... ,,' and declared
25 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
26 Spritzer, supra note 6, at 199.
27394 U.S. 316 (1969).
28 Id. at 317.
29 United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, No. 71-1105 (6th Cir. April 8, 1971), where the
court stated:
Thus the Supreme Court held that all illegally intercepted conversations
of a defendant must be made available to him, but that the District
judge may in camera ascertain which transcripts are covered by this
ruling. Of course, in this case we have no problem concerning standing.
The government concedes that Plamondon's [a defendant] own voice was
intercepted and recorded and the District Judge and this court have held
the interception to have been illegal. Id. at 30.
30430 F.2d165 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. granted 400 U.S. 990 (1971).
31 Id. at 169.
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that to allow him to do so "[w] ould be contrary to the national interest,
[these conversations] having been obtained in foreign intelligence
surveillance." 32 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but not on the
relevant fourth amendment issues.33 In the present case, the Sixth
Circuit pointed out that the Fifth Circuit in Clay squarely held that
the foreign intelligence surveillance was not unconstitutional and
that the Supreme Court refused to review the question. Therefore the
court felt the only question remaining was whether or not electronic
domestic surveillance was unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit decided
that no domestic threat to the nation's security can justify a wiretap
obtained without judicial intervention.
Having remained within the traditional bounds of judicial stare
decisis, the court still had a legislative roadblock to avoid. Did the
wiretapping provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 196834 make wiretaps like the one at issue legal? The Sixth
Circuit, by confining itself to the single issue of whether or not the
President has the power to authorize wiretaps in cases involving
domestic security problems, held that the present case was not
covered by the Act. In its argument the government relied on Section
2511 (3) of that act which deals with the President's power to authorize
wiretaps when the country's security is menaced by a foreign power.3'
However, this section says nothing about security problems arising
from within the United States. The defendants in the present case
were all citizens of the United States, and the acts for which they
were indicted allegedly occurred within the boundaries of this nation.
The court noted that nowhere in the wording of Section 2511 (3) is
there authority for the wiretaps used in this case. Had the government
followed the emergency no-warrant procedure provided by Section
82 Id. at 171.
33 United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970). The Supreme Court
reversed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals solely on the issue of whether or not
petitioner's claim of a conscientious objector draft status had been erroneously
denied him.
34 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1) (a-g) (Supp. V. 1965-69); 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (7)
(Supp. V, 1965-69); 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (3) (Supp. V, 1965-69).
3 The pertinent provisions of § 2511(3) provide:
Nothing contained in this chapter or in 605 of the Communication's Act
of 1934 shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such
measures as he deems necessary to protect the nation against actual or
potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign
intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United
States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelli-
gence activities. Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed
to limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures
as he deems necessary to protect the United States against the overt
action of the Covernment by force or other unlawful means, or against




2518 (7) of the Act, which makes no distinction between foreign and
domestic "conspiratorial activities,"3 6 the Sixth Circuit might have had
to consider the validity of the Crime Control Act. But since the gov-
ernment ignored that provision and chose to act in a more precipitous
fashion, using the Presidential authority as a cloak, the court had no
trouble in ruling that the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
was not controlling in the present case. The Sixth Circuit's decision in
this case did not run afoul of the letter of the statute, however much
some might feel it conflicted with the spirit of the Act;37 and the court's
narrow decision prevented it from considering what others feel are
"serious constitutional infirmities"38 of the Crime Control Act.
In a narrow, precise opinion the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
has ruled that the executive branch of the government has no power
to authorize wiretaps, without judicial sanction, even to protect the
national security from domestic threats. This question, one "of first
impression" at the appellate level,39 has yet to be resolved by the
36 The pertinent language of § 2518(7) reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, any investiga-
tive or -law enforcement officer, specially designated by the Attorney-
General or by the principal prosecuting attorney of any state or subdivi-
sion thereof acting pursuant to a statute of that state, who reasonably
determines that a) an emergency situation exists with respect to con-
spiratorial activities characteristic of orgied crime that requires a wire
or oral communication to be intercepted before an order authorizing such
interception can with due diligence be obtained, and b) there are grounds
upon which an order could be entered under this chapter to authorize
such interception, may intercept such wire or oral communication if an
application for an order approving the interception is made in accordance
with this section within forty-eight hours after the interception has oc-
curred, or begins to occur....
37Judge Weick, in his dissent in the present case, cites the Senate Report of
the Omnibus Crime Control Act, specifically referring to the Presidential powers
envisioned by the Senate as a result of 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (3) (Supp. V, 1965-69).
The Senate Report reads:
To assure the privacy of oral and wire communications, title 3 [the wire-
tapping provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control Act] prohibits all
wiretapping and electronic surveillance by persons other than duly
authorized law enforcement officers engaged in the investigation or
prevention of specified types of serious crimes, and only after authorization
of a court order obtained after a showing and finding of probable cause.
The only exceptions to the above prohibition are: (1) the power of the
President to obtain information by such means as he may deem neces-
sary to protect the Nation from attack or hostile acts of a foreign power,
to obtain intelligence information essential to the Nation's security, and to
protect the internal security of the United States from those who advocate
its overthrow by force or other unlawful means. 1968 U.S.C.C. and A.N.
2153.
38 Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of
"Law and Order," 67 MicH. L. Rxv. 455, 460 (1969).
89 The Court noted four District Court cases in which arose the issue
presented in the instant case. United States v. Dellinger, Criminal No. 69-180
(U.S.D.C. N.D. Ill. E.D.) decided February 20 1970, and United States v. O'Neal,
Criminal KC-CR 1204 (U.S.D.C. D. Kansas) decided September 1, 1970, resulted
in favorable decisions for the government. United States v. Smith, Criminal No.
(Continued on next page)
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Supreme Court. However, if the Supreme Court does decide to rule
on this case, the question remains as to what will be the basis of its
holdings. It may continue to expound on such nebulous concepts
as "national security," thereby circumventing the basic issue in-
volved, or it may weigh the dangers of ignoring the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers against the possibility of dis-
covering isolated plots to destroy government property. If the Court
selects the former choice, the issue may never be settled; it will
forever be at the mercy of executive or judicial whim. If the Court
should choose the latter course, however, it would at least have an
opportunity to establish a concrete and definable standard. In con-
sidering the issue, the Court, will be faced with a serious question:
What is the Attorney-General of the United States? Is he an objective
arbiter, sturdy in the position of complete neutrality, attempting
to balance personal rights secured by the Bill of Rights against the
overall fear of ultimate harm? Above all, does the United States
Constitution give him the power he is attempting to assume? Since its
inception this country has adamantly adhered to the doctrine of
separation of powers. It is not the function of the executive branch
to interpret the Constitution and laws of the United States. Further-
more, it is not the function of the Attorney-General to permit the inva-
sion of an individual's fourth amendment rights of privacy based solely
on his interpretation of the Constitution. The Attorney-General is re-
sponsible for prosecuting violations of federal law. He has the ultimate
responsibility for all government litigation that reaches the Supreme
Court. These are enforcement, not interpretive, functions. To operate
most fairly and efficiently, each branch of our government must be
limited to its precise intended responsibility. Permitting the executive
branch of the government to attach its own interpretation to the
fourth amendment by "expressly approv[ing]" electronic surveillance
without prior judicial scrutiny would frustrate the intended doctrine
of separation of powers.
Perhaps there are certain instances where prior judicial approval
must be foregone and unauthorized action by federal agents is justi-
fiable. However, the broad concept of "national interest" must be
viewed with restraint and very carefully applied. If the Supreme Court
is to give the Attorney-General subjective power in this area, it should
do so with strict qualification. The personal freedoms promulgated
in the Bill of Rights are too important to entrust their protection to any
but the most discriminating and objective. Patrick A. Thompson
4277 (U.S.D.C. C.D. California) decided January 6, 1971, and the present case,
resulted in adverse rulings for the government.
